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TWO PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
David Tucker

Edited by
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.




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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) In <u>Somalia: A Case Study</u> , Ambassador Robert Oakley details the history of problems in this area since Said Barre seized power in 1969. He analyzes the assistance provided by UNITAF and the United Nations and how this impacted upon the country and its people. The author discusses issues and problems beyond the UNITAF mandate and how the lessons learned here will provide information useful for the United States in similar situations. David Tucker, in <u>Engaging in Humanitarian Operations: Parameters for the Arguments</u> , discusses the importance of such operations but stresses the importance of selective engagement. He concludes by offering criteria to be followed in determining the appropriateness of engaging in humanitarian operations.				
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ON INTERVENTIONS
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**Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
David Tucker**

**Edited by
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July 1, 1997

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FOREWORD

A recent symposium cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce examined that grey area between war and peace, between intervention in support of national interests and humanitarian operations which, while necessary and appropriate, also put Americans in danger while consuming precious and ever scarcer resources.

The following two papers from that symposium complement each other well. In the first, a revised after action report on his experiences in Somalia, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, a career foreign service officer who served as Special Envoy to Somalia during both the present and previous administrations, provides an honest and compelling look at that controversial operation. In the second paper, Dr. David Tucker, who serves on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, dissects the arguments to develop criteria which might be used for and against engagement in humanitarian operations in an attempt to guide U.S. policymakers. Ambassador Oakley and Dr. Tucker, while approaching their subjects in two very different ways, come to the same general conclusion. They both agree that the United States, as a great power, will be engaged in intervention operations of all kinds all over the world. Ambassador Oakley contends that much that was learned from our efforts in Somalia proved beneficial in later operations, specifically in Haiti and Bosnia. Dr. Tucker, while suggesting guidelines that may be useful in determining when, where, and how to commit American military and civilian personnel to relief and humanitarian operations, also makes the point that even the best criteria can promote, but not guarantee, successful outcomes. One thing is certain, these kinds of operations are with us to stay. For that reason, I believe you will find the essays that follow both illuminating and useful.



RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS AND EDITOR

ROBERT B. OAKLEY is a member of the faculty in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. After graduating from Princeton University in 1952, Ambassador Oakley had a distinguished career in the Foreign Service during which he served in embassies in Abidjan, Saigon, Paris, and Beirut. In 1977 he was named Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from November 1979 until August 1982 and then became Ambassador to Somalia where he served until September 1984. Next he became Director of the State Department Office of Combatting Terrorism. On January 1, 1987, he was named to the National Security Council Staff as Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia, and in August 1988 became Ambassador to Pakistan. In December 1992, President Bush named Ambassador Oakley Special Envoy for Somalia and he served there with Operation Restore Hope until March 1993. Later that year, in October, President Bill Clinton called Ambassador Oakley back to this challenge, in which he served until March 1994.

DAVID TUCKER is on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Before working at the Department of Defense, he served as a Foreign Service Officer in Brazzaville, Congo; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; and Paris, France. He earned his Ph.D. in History from the Claremont Graduate School in 1981 and, prior to entering government service, was Director of the International Seminar in American Studies at the Claremont Institute. Dr. Tucker also taught at the University of Chicago as a William Rainey Harper Fellow. He is the author of "Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance," in the Summer 1993 edition of *Parameters* and the author of *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*, Praeger, 1997.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., is Director of Research and Senior Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, which he joined in 1993. Dr. Tilford is an Air Force veteran who served in Southeast Asia as an intelligence officer. He earned his B.A. and M.A. in history at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. in American and European military history at George Washington University. He is the author of three books and numerous articles on air power and the Vietnam War. His latest book, *Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup in Vietnam* was published by Texas A&M University Press in 1993. A book he co-edited with Air Force historian Dr. William P. Head, *Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back at the Persian Gulf War*, was published in 1996 by Praeger.




Figure 1. Somalia.

SOMALIA: A CASE STUDY

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley

Background.

In 1969, Siad Barre seized power in Somalia. He soon embarked upon a militaristic policy, soliciting and receiving a massive supply of weapons from the USSR. When that source dried up in 1977, he obtained more limited supplies from the United States and Italy as well as purchases off the commercial market. In the late 1980s, Siad Barre's regime became much more corrupt, more authoritarian, and more centered upon his Marehan clan and his family. Allied clans saw their share of power and influence removed while the repression of opposition groups and former loyalists became increasingly brutal and deadly. This provoked wide-scale revolt in the north which soon spread into a fulminating civil war. In 1989, the opposition formed a loose coalition, the United Somali Congress (USC), consisting of some 15 politico-military groups. To a degree, it was based upon clan and geography centered upon the Hawiyeh clan in the area around Mogadishu. Siad Barre was ousted from Mogadishu in January 1991; but fighting continued between remnants of his forces and between elements of the USC, which split in the contest for succession to Siad. Much of the fighting took place in the heavily populated central-south region of Somalia, the primary grain-growing region. Farmers left their lands and food production virtually ceased. This region had already been hit hard by a drought which began in 1989. Food deliveries from abroad were used as an instrument of war, with each faction claiming them for its own supporters and using force to deny food to others.

The result was a massive loss of life during 1991 due to famine and civil war. There was also a total collapse of national authority and institutions. Between November and

December 1991 and March and April 1992, the civil war in Somalia claimed 30,000 lives and at least that many wounded. By June 1992, an estimated 300,000 people had died of famine, and the death rate was reaching 3,000 each day with 1.5 million more people at risk unless help came soon. Additionally, there were 1.5 million refugees and an equal number of internally displaced persons in the country.

Efforts by the United Nations and humanitarian agencies to deliver food were met with armed opposition and hijacking of relief supplies. Television coverage of the crisis touched off great concern in the United States and Europe, with public and political pressure building for more forceful action by the international community.

In July 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved an airlift of food as well as a protective U.N. force to help deliver the food. On August 14, 1992, President George Bush ordered the establishment of a United States Air Force airlift under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), operating out of Mombassa, Kenya. Soon USAF C-130s were flying into Somalia as a part of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. In total, some 28,000 tons of food were hauled into the country over a 6-months period. In September 1992, 500 Pakistani U.N. peacekeepers were airlifted to Mogadishu by the Air Force. Neither the U.S. airlift nor the U.N. force, however, was able to open up significant food deliveries to the interior. The civil war continued along with famine, wide-spread death, and massive refugees flows; with agonizing images shown daily on the television news.

During October and November 1992, the United States and the United Nations struggled in vain to find some means to stop this all too visible and all too deadly crisis. Meanwhile, the shelling of cargo ships prevented them from making port. On November 21, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) informed the Deputies Committees that it had no confidence in proposals for incremental increases in the U.N. force or, indeed, any foreseeable U.N. force. They proposed the idea for an international coalition analogous to DESERT STORM, built around a core of two U.S.

divisions and led by the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF) operating under CENTCOM. Only this sort of large-scale, rapid-action force could blanket and extinguish the conflict so that relief supplies could reach the hundreds of thousands of people at risk before it was too late. On the same day, CENTCOM notified the 1st MEF that a military operation was possible.

By November 25, the 1st MEF and CENTCOM had developed a Commander's estimate of the situation. On the same day, President Bush approved the JCS option of a large U.S.-led combined joint task force (CJTF) and ordered that it arrive in Somalia as soon as possible. At the suggestion of the JCS Chairman General Colin Powell, I was asked to provide political guidance for the U.S. force. Diplomatic consultations with other potential force-contributing countries, key members of the UNSC, and with U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began the following day. They were informed of the U.S. plan, asked to support it, and advised that the United States would be willing to place the operation under the UNSC, provided that there would be no interference with U.S. freedom of command and control for the entire force. The U.N. Secretary General and members of the UNSC approved of the operation, and key countries expressed their support and willingness to participate. The recommendation was, however, that the operation be conducted outside the formal U.N. framework with UNSC endorsement; just as Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM had been approved by, but not placed under, the UNSC.

On November 30, 1992, a four-ship amphibious task unit carrying a special purpose marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF) moved toward Mogadishu. Maritime prepositioning force ships at Diego Garcia were ordered to move on December 7. On December 3, the UNSC adopted a resolution calling upon member states to "use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." President Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and General Powell announced on December 4 that the United States was launching a major

coalition operation to protect humanitarian operations, and that matters would then be turned over to a U.N. peacekeeping force. The plan they announced was based upon the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, which calls for the use of overwhelming force at the outset in pursuit of a clearly defined and limited mission. Also, in accordance with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, an exit strategy, that was to turn the operation over to the United Nations, had been established. And, at least at the outset, the operation had strong support among the American people. They also indicated that, for the first time, regular U.S. units would participate in a U.N. peacekeeping force to follow the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The response to the proposed U.S. action in Somalia was overwhelmingly favorable in December 1992.

The quickly-developed, bare-bones CENTCOM plan, formally approved on December 5, was adapted from plans used for DESERT STORM and command post exercise (CPX) rehearsals conducted several months earlier for a humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. It included up-to-date information on the humanitarian operations needing protection, derived from the CENTCOM-run Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, and from consultations with the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and key non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in Somalia. I arrived in Mogadishu on December 7 to establish a U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) and began to assemble a team of officers experienced with Somalia. I contacted the major Somali political and military leaders to convince them to cooperate with the United States and UNITAF rather than oppose them. The leaders agreed, and the landing by the SPMAGTF on December 9 was executed smoothly and peacefully, except for the disruption of a crowd of media representatives who appeared unexpectedly on the beach. They had been alerted to the landing by U.S. military sources eager for good publicity but who had failed to inform the landing teams that the media would be on hand.

UNITAF: December 9, 1992-May 4, 1993.

The Phase One Objective (December 10-16). The Phase One Objective was to establish a base of operations and a logistical base in Mogadishu. With this base, UNITAF could gain control over the flow of relief supplies, introduce other U.N. forces and secure the outlying city of Baidoa.

On December 9, Special Operations Forces landed and were soon followed by 1,400 U.S. Marines (2/3 SPMAGTF, 1/3 airlift from the 1st Marine Division). They took control of the port, airfield, and the U.S. Embassy compound, which became the UNITAF headquarters. Contact was established with representatives of the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). The CJTF Commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnson, arrived on December 10. He and I, along with the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, had our first face-to-face meeting with Mohammed Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their top lieutenants on December 11. The Somalis reached a seven-point agreement on a cease-fire, free movements in the city, removal of "technicals" and militias from the city to designated locations, and establishing a joint committee on security matters. That committee met almost every day during the entire period of the UNITAF, usually with representatives of General Johnson and myself present, and often with us personally in attendance. It greatly facilitated dialogue, with a surprising degree of understanding on all sides; helped to reduce tensions created by occasional incidents; and was an important factor in the low number of casualties and the relative peace and stability in Mogadishu. (After the forces of U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) arrived, the joint committee was disbanded, and the dialogue between UNOSOM and the parties virtually ceased.)

Canadian and French troops started arriving on December 12, being the first of an allied force which eventually totaled 10,000. The CJTF designated eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) (which later became nine) and took control of the first sector outside Mogadishu

on December 13, that being Baladogle Airfield. By the end of December, and one month ahead of schedule, all of the HRS were occupied. Meanwhile, the maritime prepositioning ships started unloading in Mogadishu's port on December 13. The army prepositioning ships had too much draft and were obliged to off-load in Mombassa. This massive logistical effort through a broken-down port resulted in 34 military ships and 14 civilian ships unloading some 114,000 tons of supplies over a 35-day period. The scheduling of ship movements, repair of facilities, mobilization and use of Somali manpower, and the locating, loading, and scheduling of trucks to haul supplies were skillfully orchestrated by the senior Navy representative, Rear Admiral Perkins, with the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator, the World Food Program (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and many NGOs.

On December 12, I visited Baidoa to hold two meetings: the first with representatives of the Somali community, including various factions, clan elders, religious leaders and women; and the second with foreign humanitarian workers. Both went well. The next day, the Marines occupied Baidoa, a week ahead of schedule. This set a pattern for all HRS occupations—I would visit and meet with community representatives; soon thereafter the military would arrive to a peaceful welcome. All occupations conducted in this manner were peaceful. For instance, the Somalis in Baidoa continued to have regular meetings with U.S. representatives from both the military and civilian sectors on security and humanitarian matters. Eventually two committees were established as a form of local government not dominated by factions but by local clan, religious and other representatives.

The Phase Two Objective (December 17-29). The Phase Two Objective was to expand operations to provide security to all HRS. The goal for completion was to achieve security and start the movement of relief convoys.

On December 14, the civil military operations center (CMOC) of the CJTF and representatives of USAID/OFDA

set up a humanitarian operations center (HOC) to coordinate military-humanitarian activities under the chairmanship of the U.N. humanitarian affairs coordinator, Phil Johnson. This was critical to the success of UNITAF and humanitarian operations, and the HOC performed very well. It allowed the NGOs and U.N. agencies to cooperate with one another and with UNITAF military units on humanitarian and security issues. Similar CMOC/HOC operations were set up for each humanitarian relief sector with U.S. or other military representatives, OFDA, and NGO/UN representatives.

On December 15, U.S. Army forces relieved the Marines at Baladogle. Four days later, UNITAF radio station "Raja" (Hope) began to broadcast throughout the country. On December 20, loudspeaker teams began operating as did a Somali language newspaper, also called *Raja*. These proved to be effective psyops instruments and they were critical in avoiding major confrontations with Somali factions as well as vital to our efforts at gaining popular support. The influence of Aideed and Ali Mahdi's radio broadcasts and pamphlets was lessened to a significant degree by the use of Raja Radio and the *Raja* newspaper.

On December 20, USMC and Belgian forces secured Kismaayo. Three days later, U.S. Army engineers and Navy Seabee units began building and improving roads in all eight HRSs. They also constructed airfields to handle C-130 and helicopter operations and built base camps for UNITAF in Mogadishu and in each relief sector. (By March 1, 1993, some 2,500 kilometers of roads, nine airfields, and 15 helicopter landing pads had been built.) On Christmas day, 1992, the Marines and French forces secured Oddur. In Kismaayo and Oddur I continued my practice of preceding the military to meet with local representatives before the troops arrived. On December 26, the security agreement for Mogadishu, agreed to by Aideed and Ali Mahdi on December 11, went into effect. Somali factions withdrew their "technicals," the heavily-armed paramilitary forces that patrolled the streets of Mogadishu in pickup trucks, in accordance with UNITAF orders to get all weapons which

did not have permits off the streets. Raja Radio, the *Raja* newspaper, the radios operated by the various factions, and psychological operations (psyop) pamphlets explained the situation to the Somalis. By January 5, 1993, all weapons were effectively off the streets. Meanwhile, on December 27, Italian units secured Gailalassi, and the next day U.S. Army (USARFOR) and Canadian troops moved into Beledweyne. In every case, relief convoys began bringing in food and other supplies just as soon as the military had occupied these towns. On December 31, an additional HRS was created at Merca, a town south of Mogadishu, with USARFOR and Italian participation. This was done to counter the pressure being exerted by Somali bandits on NGOs in a key agricultural and population center, and to assuage Italian political angst over what they perceived to be the low visibility of their forces in a former Italian colony. By January 1, 1993, convoys had reached each of the HRS, marking the end of Phase Two Operations. By this time, over 20,000 American troops were in Somalia.

Phase Three UNITAF Objective (January 1-February 4). The mission objective for Phase Three Operations was to expand activities to additional ports and airfields, and to broaden the security for relief convoys and other activities. The goal for completion of Phase Three was to break the famine and the cycle of looting and to prepare the way for U.N. forces to relieve UNITAF.

On New Year's Day, fast sea lift ships began arriving from the United States. UNITAF, along with the U.S. Navy, had taken operational and security control of the ports, repaired the facilities, and gotten logistics into high gear to include cooperative efforts with World Food Project, the Red Cross, and many NGOs to get food convoys safely to their destinations and unloaded. The USMC had begun to patrol and also had established a secondary headquarters in the northern part of Mogadishu to increase overall security and to respond to complaints of Ali Mahdi and others that all U.S./UNITAF attention was going to Mohammed Aideed in south Mogadishu. During the first week in January, security was good enough so that U.N. Secretary General

Boutrous-Ghali and President Bush were both able to visit, the former being greeted with scary but peaceful anti-U.N. demonstrations orchestrated by Aideed. President Bush's visit was without incident.

The U.N. "preliminary" political reconciliation conference began in Addis on January 4, presided over by the U.N. Secretary General. Mohammed Aideed and 14 other Somalian leaders attended, partly due to U.S. pressure on Aideed, who had a strong dislike for Boutrous-Ghali. On January 7, after being fired upon repeatedly and having their warnings ignored, U.S. Marines attacked two of Aideed's weapons storage sites and destroyed the weapons. In the wake of this incident, after meeting with UNITAF commanders, Aideed went on his own radio station to denounce those Somalis involved (whom he did not identify) as undisciplined. In January, the 15 Somali factions reached a general agreement in Addis to hold a major reconciliation conference in March and to establish an early cease-fire throughout the country. They reached a specific, separate agreement on disarmament. The provisions of that agreement included turning over heavy weapons, calling together various armed militia units to be disarmed and disbanded, establishing a UNITAF/U.N. cease-fire monitoring group, returning unlawfully-confiscated properties, and freeing prisoners of war. The United Nations asked UNITAF's help in working out details of the disarmament agreement in Mogadishu. UNITAF and USLO officers began working with the factions on a plan, as well as with the humanitarian agencies needed to provide food and jobs for the demobilized militias.

On January 16, Australian units relieved the U.S. Marines in Baidoa, and Moroccan troops replaced USARFOR in Baledogle. The following day, "quick reaction" responsibilities shifted to USARFOR. Two days later, on January 19, the first U.S. combat unit rotated out of Somalia and U.S. force levels began to decline from their peak of 20,000. Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, planning began to establish some 35 feeding centers to be run by the various NGOs and Somali women. Additionally, UNITAF, the

USLO, and the Somali joint security committee were making plans to reestablish a police force in Mogadishu and exploring ways to further calm the political climate, while involving Somalis more in the running of their own affairs. These were local initiatives because the U.N. Headquarters, CENTCOM, OSD/JCS, and the State Department were all reluctant to get involved, fearing legal problems and "mission creep" implicit in initiatives undertaken outside the original plan.

In Kismaayo, trouble broke out in the city on January 24 due to a struggle between two Somali factions—one loyal to Omar Jesse (an Aideed ally), and the other loyal to Hersi Morgan (Siad Barre's son-in-law). At this point, the USARFOR commanders and I met with all the local leaders to calm things down. But with Hersi Morgan maneuvering his units outside the city and Omar Jesse maintaining a presence with his forces inside the city, and U.S. Army and Belgian units separating the two, the situation remained tense.

On February 4, General Johnson declared the third phase completed with UNITAF ready to hand over control to a U.N. force whenever the latter would be ready to take over. Humanitarian operations were proceeding rapidly in all parts of the country, death from famine had disappeared, port and airfield operations were greatly improved, as were roads and regular convoys for relief operations. Additionally, both direct and indirect humanitarian support by UNITAF forces was making a big difference. The intensive, wide-spread factional fighting had given way to isolated clashes.

Formal and informal coordination between NGOs and U.N. agencies, and with UNITAF, was remarkably good if still uneasy. This lack of complete comfort was due to:

- the impossibility of so many NGOs being organized and commanded by anyone in contrast with the military's clear lines of command;

- cultural gaps between the relief organizations and the various military communities;
- scattered violence and looting of relief agencies by Somalis which UNITAF was unable to prevent; and,
- differences of view over the use of armed Somalis by relief organizations to guard their activities and facilities.

By February, 35 feeding stations were operating in Mogadishu, feeding one million persons per week and protected in the first instance by a new Somali police force backed up by UNITAF units from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Italy, Pakistan, and the U.S. Marine Corps. The city was calm and no guns were visible on the streets. At the same time, a further reduction in the U.S. military presence occurred when Marine combat engineers and the amphibious ship, *Tripoli*, which had initiated the landing on December 9, departed during the last week of February.

On February 22, a serious incident in Kismaayo threatened to disrupt the real progress made throughout the country and to call into question the judgment that Phase Three had been completed. In small groups of twos and threes, soldiers loyal to Hersi Morgan infiltrated past U.S. and Belgian forces into the center of Kismaayo where they located hidden weapons. They then conducted raids on five buildings occupied by Omar Jesse's forces. They were quickly brought under control by UNITAF but not before Jesse's forces, including hundreds employed by various relief agencies as guards, left town in a panic, taking relief agency vehicles and supplies with them. General Johnson and I immediately ordered Jesse's forces to stay outside Kismaayo, and forbade Morgan's forces from entering the city, and moved both of them back some 40 kilometers or more, where they were to remain indefinitely. This greatly eased tensions in Kismaayo.

However, Aideed, believing an erroneous BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) broadcast that Morgan had seized control of Kismaayo, assumed collaboration between

his opponents and UNITAF. In protest, beginning February 24 and lasting until the 26th, he launched anti-UNITAF street demonstrations in south Mogadishu and mounted an armed attack upon the Nigerian contingent. The latter, forewarned by U.S. intelligence, repulsed the attack easily. Within 48 hours, on March 2, the pro-Aideed demonstrations had run their course with no damage to the relief agencies or U.N. installations, other than to jangle the nerves of many relief workers. UNITAF had provided ample protection and there had been no trouble outside Aideed-controlled territory in south Mogadishu. Aideed was given a strong warning afterward, and promised to avoid further demonstrations. He kept his word for the duration of UNITAF's presence.

Issues and Problems Beyond the Narrow UNITAF Mandate.

UNITAF successfully completed its assigned humanitarian mission by February 4, 1993, well ahead of schedule. In fact, the UNITAF had, at times, gone beyond its assigned mission by carrying out limited but important activities which would enhance prospects for long-term security and for political reconciliation at the local level. The establishment of police forces and limited efforts at disarmament and arms control were indicative of these additional efforts. The goals of these "extra-curricular activities," ultimately, were to make easier the security task of the U.N. force once it took control and to help the United Nations with its continuing responsibility for national political reconciliation. They also enhanced security for U.S. forces by reducing chances for anti-UNITAF violence.

Some discussion of how these and other activities evolved and of the differences of view on specific issues between the U.S. National Command Authority and UNITAF on one side, and the U.N. Secretary General and some of the NGOs on the other side, is needed at this point to provide additional perspective.

Scope and Mandate of Mission and Use of Coercion: Issue at Dispute. The U.N. Secretary General and some NGOs wanted UNITAF to forcibly disarm all factions and seize all heavy weapons. They also wanted a military push against various factions to support U.N. political reconciliation efforts. The Secretary General saw this as a prerequisite for the United Nations takeover from U.S./UNITAF forces. The United States rejected this approach.

Discussion: President Bush was unable to make such a major, long-term commitment since he was, after the November 1992 elections, in a "lame duck" status and there was no Congress to consult on such a long-term commitment of U.S. forces. Also, the United States wanted to avoid violent confrontation so as to allow humanitarian operations to succeed rapidly. This would save more Somali lives, minimize casualties to its own and allied forces, and allow the United States to withdraw and turn its mission over to the United Nations sooner rather than later. This approach was agreed to by other UNITAF troop contributors, including Italy, France, Canada, and Morocco. Furthermore, Washington was not prepared to accept long-term overall responsibility for Somalia.

The United States was convinced that despite its own military superiority, the Somalis would fight rather than give up all their weapons under external coercion. Complete disarmament of all the factions would have required at least a doubling of the UNITAF personnel and, almost certainly, would have resulted in substantial casualties, as well as a disruption of humanitarian operations.

The United States was prepared to support and assist the United Nations on the broader, long-term issue of beginning a systematic program of voluntary demobilization and disarmament under United Nations auspices, but not willing to accept formal responsibility for this long-term, major program. Its UNITAF partners agreed with this proposal and were prepared to participate. The United Nations, however, refused responsibility. Consequently, the program was not undertaken.

Humanitarian Activities Have Political Implications: Issue at Dispute. Because humanitarian activities do, indeed, have political implications, the US/UNITAF should have agreed in advance on a long-term political plan. In retrospect, the United States and the UNITAF were politically biased in dealing too much with the two major factions led by “warlords” Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Aided.

Discussion: The United States and other governments contributing to the UNITAF saw themselves supporting the United Nations on long-term political matters rather than themselves assuming this sort of responsibility. They were willing to help the United Nations by encouraging factions to participate and seek compromises. The United States and others facilitated the Somali creation of police forces, local committees, and councils, including Aided-Ali Mahdi joint committees in Mogadishu, where these two held onto military and political power, and councils in other HRS dominated by whomever dominated the local power structure politically. Force was not allowed to coerce these councils. This was done in an effort to enhance security, facilitate humanitarian operations and lay the basic foundation for long-term political reconstruction, and to encourage the Somalis to decide among themselves how best to proceed rather than trying to dictate to them or impose external ideas on these issues.

The dialogue with Aided and Ali Mahdi was not a question of favoritism or endorsing their status as warlords. It was coupled with local dialogues in all HRS locations which was not, in most cases, based on factions. Logistics, force security, and rapid humanitarian action to save lives required dialogue with Aided, Ali Mahdi, and other militia leaders. The NGOs and United Nations had, for some time, inadvertently been building up Aided by leasing over 500 pieces of property in his part of Mogadishu and using his militia as guards, thus assisting him financially and putting themselves in a vulnerable position. Placing UNITAF Headquarters in this southern part of the city compounded the problem but made sense for protection of humanitarian

operations as well as for more effective operations and logistics. (The only usable port and operational airport were in South Mogadishu.)

Both the United States and the UNITAF were very aware of the problem of real or perceived bias and took great pains to balance those actions. Aideed complained about tough measures against the Somalia National Alliance units in Mogadishu and Kismaayo, but similar acts were taken against others, like Morgan in Kismaayo, who also complained. When Aideed's arms depots were seized, so were those belonging to Ali Mahdi. U.S./UNITAF representatives met frequently with clan elders, lawyers, teachers, women, and religious leaders in Mogadishu and the various HRS, as well as with faction and militia leaders. This complemented efforts by Raja Radio and the *Raja* newspaper to reach out to the entire country.

Disarmament: Issue at Dispute. The United States and UNITAF refused to carry out disarmament, thereby undercutting UNOSOM II.

Discussion: The United States and UNITAF worked with all Somali factions after the January 15 disarmament agreement, and concluded a more detailed agreement by February 15. They also talked to the United Nations and NGOs about material support to include jobs and food. At a meeting of senior American UNITAF commanders and the commanders of other major task force units, U.N. representatives refused to accept U.S./UNITAF's local offer of help to start implementation under U.N. formal authority and with the United Nations assuming long-term operational responsibility as soon as its forces arrived. Moreover, the United Nations, NGOs, the United States, and the other involved governments were unwilling to put up large-scale resources needed for demobilizing the militias. (This is unlike Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Namibia where this was, in fact, accomplished.) There was a good start on demobilizing heavy weapons and getting all weapons off the street in all central HRS localities, but nothing more than that. No plan existed to seize heavy weapons outside Mogadishu and

around the periphery of the other HRS. Fearing mission creep, Washington did not initially support the arms control plan or the police initiatives but allowed UNITAF to do so. As discussed, the United Nations was not ready to take on these missions even when UNITAF offered to begin them under U.N. supervision. This created a major long-term problem for UNOSOM II.

Mission Creep. Issue at Dispute: The United States and UNITAF went too far by conducting activities beyond their mandate and thereby sowed the seeds for future trouble.

Discussion: The U.S./UNITAF took on direct humanitarian activities, energized local political activities, helped set up local police forces in Mogadishu and other towns, and arranged various sporting events. All these were beyond a strict interpretation of its mission and mandate, but UNITAF was convinced that these activities improved force security by winning public support, keeping the use of U.S. personnel on the streets to a minimum, and reducing the potential for attacks from various Somali factions. They were also consistent with the larger mission of facilitating security so that the United Nations could take over. Although expressing initial reservations, the U.S. Central Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in such limited "extra" activities.

These "extras" were not at the expense of the implementation of primary mission objectives, nor did they interfere with established priorities. Furthermore, with the exception of police training, they did not become *de facto* long-term responsibilities of UNITAF. American and UNITAF civilian and military leaders repeatedly made the point to the Somalis that the United Nations would soon assume responsibility from the United States and UNITAF. Therefore, the Somalis, including Mohammed Aideed, should go to U.N. conferences to work out their problems with the United Nations. Otherwise, there would be no more international support for Somalia's return to normalcy. The subsequent broadening of UNOSOM II's mission was not due to mission creep but to explicit Security Council resolutions approved by the United States. There was no

"creep" involved, except in the belated understanding of U.S. and U.N. leaders of what resources would be needed for implementation of the expanded, more confrontational mandate.

Not Enough U.S./UNITAF Understanding of the Somalis. Discussion: Dialogue was conducted by the United States with joint committees in Mogadishu every day, and also by other UNITAF commanders in other locations. The biggest problem was in Kismaayo, where there was indeed an inadequate UNITAF appreciation of the complicated political-military clan situation, especially the rivalry between Omar Jess and Hersi Morgan. For his part, Mohammed Aideed was suspicious but mostly restrained. Aside from the February 24 demonstrations in Mogadishu, Aideed behaved so long as the UNITAF was present. However, he was planning future moves to advance his own interests when the United Nations takeover occurred. He was not alone in doing so.

Phase Four UNITAF (February 5 to May 4). There were problems with some infiltrators from Hersi Morgan's militia in Kismaayo on February 22. After 3 or more hours of gunfire between midnight and dawn, they were ousted. These problems were soon followed with similar incidents involving Aideed's militia in Mogadishu from February 24-26. Aideed blamed the United States for allowing his rival, Hersi Morgan, to gain an advantage in Kismaayo. Both the Hersi Morgan and Omar Jess forces were forcibly evacuated from Kismaayo by UNITAF and prevented from returning. Additionally, Hersi Morgan's forces were hit hard by helicopter gunships. Aideed's adventures in Mogadishu were very limited geographically and burned themselves out by February 26, after a failed attack on Nigerian units. This attack, however, generated a good deal of excitement in the media since it occurred in an area adjacent to the hotel where most of the reporters stayed. Aideed was warned severely and privately by senior U.S. officials not to repeat this offense, and he did not until after the U.S. and UNITAF units had pulled out and given responsibility for Mogadishu and all of Somalia to the U.N. force. The U.S. Army forces,

meanwhile, remained in Kismaayo under Belgian command after February 22 rather than withdrawing as planned so that they could provide a greater amount of reassurance. In late February and early March, Marine forces began to pull out.

The national reconciliation conference run by the United Nations at Addis from March 13-27, 1993, produced an agreement by all 15 factions on a new interim local, regional, and national political and administrative framework. However, the details were left to be worked out in further negotiations; this was not achieved by U.N. negotiators since all the factions were not willing to relinquish long-standing aspirations for power or drop individual rivalries. Aideed's drive to gain political power during the further negotiations was more blatant than similar maneuvers of Ali Mahdi, Morgan, and other faction leaders. It ultimately resulted in the United Nations moving to political and then to military confrontation against his Somali National Alliance.

By March 15, Retired Admiral John Howe had assumed the position of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR), and I had returned to the United States. This was done as a deliberate signal of the success attained by UNITAF in achieving its limited mission and to show that the U.N., with continued support from the United States, henceforth would be the primary external actor on the Somali stage. On March 27, the UNSC passed a resolution establishing UNOSOM II and the formal transition began. The United Nations, however, had not done detailed, advanced planning for the transition. This was despite the U.N. Secretary General's agreement of early January, reached in Mogadishu with Lieutenant General Johnson, that specified sending out an advance U.N. headquarters team to start this planning by February 1. A Turkish lieutenant general and a U.S. major general were named as commander and deputy commander for UNOSOM II and arrived in late March, but there was no staff. The U.N. Secretariat, including Admiral Howe, argued for the United States to stay longer and assume more activities.

They objected to the May 4 hand-off date, but the United States insisted. UNOSOM II was down to 14,000 troops by mid-May after Australia and Canada pulled their forces out and new units expected from Pakistan, India, and Germany were slow to arrive. The United States left a 3,000-man logistics team and a U.S. Army 1,000-man quick reaction force (QRF), and a headquarters contingent in country to support the U.N.

UNITAF casualties had totaled 24 wounded and 8 killed in action with 10 more killed in accidents during its 5-month deployment. Except for a few incidents involving Belgians in Kismaayo, UNITAF units followed the U.S. lead in exercising maximum restraint with locals, although the rules of engagement allowed them to fire if they felt threatened in addition to firing in self-defense. The number of Somali casualties was probably around 200 militia killed in fire fights (especially Hersi Morgan and Omar Jess militiamen killed in and around Kismaayo) and less than 100 civilians killed as a result of actual fighting. In most cases, this was due to being caught in crossfires. This compares with 30 U.S. and 68 U.N. peacekeepers killed and 173 U.S. and 262 U.N. peacekeepers wounded and 6,000 to 8,000 Somalis killed during the UNOSOM II period.

UNOSOM II: May 5, 1993-March 23, 1994.

A much more intrusive, coercive mandate from the UNSC instructed UNOSOM II to disarm factions or bandits and bring about a political settlement by force if necessary, in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. But at the time of transition, UNOSOM II had only 14,000 personnel (by late summer its numbers would reach 20,000). As a shrewd observer stated, "UNITAF had maximal force but only limited resources; UNOSOM II had maximal objectives but only a limited force." UNOSOM II also suffered from weak and confused command and control, had neither a psyops capability (like the *Raja* newspaper and radio operated by UNITAF) nor a clear agreement by all contributors and their troops as to the objectives or the rules of engagement allowing for the use of force. The divided

command between the United States and its QRF on the one hand, and UNOSOM II on the other, proved to be another element of weakness. There was also a major problem of poor political understanding and coordination of political, military, and humanitarian activities by UNOSOM II.

Aideed immediately challenged UNOSOM's perceived weakness by putting his militia back on the streets. UNOSOM replied by "marginalizing" Aideed politically and then seeking to apply military pressure by conducting short-notice inspections of his weapons storage sites and radio station. On June 5, a Pakistani unit engaged in one of these inspections despite Aideed's warnings not to do so, was attacked and had 23 soldiers killed. The next day, the UNSC passed a resolution calling for the arrest, trial, and punishment of those who were responsible. On June 12, U.N. forces and U.S. gunships attacked Aideed's weapons sites. On June 17, a major fight cost the lives of one Pakistani and four Moroccan soldiers. A few weeks later, on July 3, three Italian soldiers were killed in clashes with Aideed forces.

On July 12, senior members of Aideed's militia and leaders from other subclans and factions gathered to discuss possible policy changes, including a less belligerent approach to the United Nations and the possibility of Mohammed Aideed leaving the country for a while. Without warning, U.S. gunships attacked this convocation, killing between 20 and 40 Somalis.

After that incident, it was an all-out war, with U.S. facilities and personnel being singled out for deliberate attack. Many Somalis who had not previously supported Mohammed Aideed moved to his side. Aideed's SNA skillfully portrayed this situation as being engaged in a "David and Goliath" struggle between Somali patriots and foreign invaders; between Moslems and Infidels. In the West, public opinion was critical of the United Nations and opinion in Moslem countries was even stronger. During this period, Italy, France, Zimbabwe and other contingents of UNOSOM, on orders from home, stopped participating in anti-Aideed operations, thus further weakening an already

lame U.N. command authority. Much of the humanitarian activity stopped and various NGOs voiced their criticisms of both the United Nations and the United States.

Meanwhile, the United States strongly supported UNOSOM Resolution 837 of June 6 calling for the arrest of Mohammed Aideed. Washington was committed to a world-wide, assertive U.N. peacekeeping role and to nation-building and fostering democracy as a part of U.S. national policy. Somalia had become a test case. However, Washington did not agree to requests for more U.S. military forces until late August, after several American troops had been killed. At that point, on August 27, 1993, Task Force Ranger was deployed. After several previous raids were carried out on Aideed's forces, Task Force Ranger ran into major trouble on October 3 and 4 when 18 soldiers were killed and 78 wounded. This incident caused such a negative public and political reaction across the United States that the Clinton administration was forced to withdraw U.S. forces. In this case, however, withdrawal took place only after temporary U.S. reinforcements were sent in and other countries were persuaded by the United States to stay with the United Nations after its own forces left on March 23, 1994. One year later, the last U.N. forces left in an exemplary evacuation operation led by the United States, with Pakistani UNOSOM forces providing excellent rear-guard protection which precluded any further U.N. casualties.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

The Clinton administration's idealistic commitment to a more aggressive use of the United Nations to rebuild failed states and to promote democratic values received the kind of rude jolt in Somalia in 1993 that the Reagan administration had received in Lebanon a decade earlier. UNITAF was a very successful operation, but this was lost from view in the public and political uproar over the later problems of UNOSOM II and the loss of U.S. lives. The U.N. Secretary General and other members of the Security Council also learned the hard way about the limitations of

U.N. peacekeepers. Subsequent U.N. operations have been more modest and better planned and, since 1993, there has been a marked increase in the effectiveness of the U.N. Secretariat. Listed below are some summary lessons I believe can be learned from Somalia for peace operations generally.

Cooperation among political, military, and humanitarian functions worked reasonably well with UNITAF. The UNITAF-UNOSOM transition, however, failed, and the subsequent greatly expanded UNOSOM mission had an inadequate understanding of the local situation and insufficient resources. That created serious problems which eventually brought the entire Somalia operation into question.

An estimated 200,000 Somali lives were saved by rapid UNITAF action. Early distribution of tools, seeds, and other commodities restored farming and livestock to a satisfactory level. Subsequent harvests have been close to normal, and the occasional political clashes are far from the kind of intensive fighting that raged throughout Somalia in 1991 and 1992.

The CMOC/OFDA/NGO formal coordinating mechanisms proved effective, but much more liaison of an informal nature was also involved. This is essential. One also needs a formal, top-level strategy committee of military and civilian personnel to ensure better coordination and to see that humanitarian and political issues get adequate attention from military forces and *vice versa*.

Most of the mistakes made in Somalia by the United Nations and the United States were not evident in the subsequent deployment to Haiti. Among the positive results in Haiti was a smooth, well-planned transition between U.S. and U.N. authority. The advance team for the U.N. follow-on force was on the ground alongside the US-led multinational force months before the United Nations assumed command.

Modest U.S. participation with unique skills of psyops, civil affairs, special forces, engineers, intelligence, and C³I may be enough in some situations. Ground combat units are

not always going to be needed. However, total absence of U.S. participation is an error which diminishes U.S. influence generally and hampers the potential effectiveness of any particular operation.

The United States should not run scared. The retreat of the *Harlan County* in Haiti and Washington's initial reluctance to commit ground forces to Bosnia made it look easy to intimidate the United States and put the nation in jeopardy of losing its mantle of global leadership. This can create situations where the United States has no choice but to act later and on a much larger scale, as was the case in Bosnia, and to do so, perhaps, under worse conditions.

In such future operations, the United States should:

- Carefully assess the situation on the ground both at the beginning and throughout any peace operation.
- Set realistic objectives consistent with the resources available and the degree and durability of support at home and abroad.
- Explain to Congress and the public the nature, benefits, and likely cost of the pending operation in order to gain support and to sustain it over the long haul.
- Ensure unity of command and cohesion of effort by all forces through continuous dialogue and liaison.
- Combine political, military, and humanitarian operations.
- Work hard on public information both inside the country (psyops) and with the American and foreign media.
- Not get deeply involved in the internal political and social problems of other countries.

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- Not, however, settle for partial solutions or the mere containment of a situation merely so an arbitrary deadline for withdrawal can be met, especially if a more effective long-term solution can be reached without provoking a backlash in the country being helped or at home.
 - Lastly, by gradually reducing the size and mission of international intervention, often the United States can realize a smooth termination.

Somalia was an unhappy experience, especially for a nation whose military forces had been so successful in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM only 2 years before. Its lessons, like those drawn a quarter of a century ago from our ill-fated venture in Vietnam, must be taken judiciously. But history is the only reliable guide we have to the future, and for that reason I hope what is offered here may be of benefit.

ENGAGING IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS: PARAMETERS FOR THE ARGUMENTS

David Tucker

The Need for Engagement.

Despite some globalist rhetoric in the administrations both of George Bush and Bill Clinton, political necessity since the collapse of the Soviet Union has compelled the United States to implement a strategy of selective engagement. Criteria for engagement that specify when, where, and how we engage are the essence of such a strategy. Such criteria should provide guidance for undertaking the various activities that make up our national strategy. They help us decide, for example, when and how to intervene abroad, what trade-offs to make between our concern with human rights and our need to control certain regional balances of power, and whether to bear the cost of economic sanctions in order to punish states that sponsor terrorism. Only with criteria for engagement in mind can we make such decisions and apply our resources in a rational way.

It would be wrong to imply that strategies besides selective engagement do not require engagement criteria. Indeed, when our strategy was containment such criteria existed in several different versions. But it is also a fact that the Soviet Union helped us write them, as it were, by the way it acted, since containment was a defensive or reactive strategy. Now that the Soviet Union has disappeared, we are much freer than we were to write our own criteria. Generally speaking, a country's need for such guidelines is directly proportionate to the extent of its involvement in the world. If a country has limited commercial or more general foreign interests, it can concentrate on those. Its need for criteria to guide its involvement in the world will be limited. If, on the other hand, a country has extensive foreign

interests, it will have great need of such criteria. This is the case with the United States. American interests are so extensive that the U.S. Government cannot engage to protect every one of them. The United States is in a position analogous to that of Britain in the last half of the 19th century when a British minister cautioned that Britain's universal commerce circumscribed rather than widened Britain's field of action. To act in defense of every one of its interests, he warned, would involve Britain simultaneously in some 40 wars.¹ For a country with global interests, commercial and otherwise, it is not enough to know that its interests are at stake in some problem or conflict, for every problem or conflict will impinge somehow on its interests. Since interests do not automatically generate the resources necessary to defend them, a country with global interests must decide which are most important to defend and at what level of resources. Failure to make such decisions might lead to squandering assets and, over time, such wastefulness could prove fatal.

Our general strategic orientation will also determine the kind of criteria for engagement we need. Guidelines to help us determine when, where, and how to invest our national security resources are particularly necessary for a strategy, like the one that the United States is now following, that assumes that indirect threats have a cumulative effect that must be dealt with. Such a strategy, unlike one that counsels little or no engagement with the world, argues for addressing threats as they emerge so that we avoid the slow erosion of our strategic position. In doing so, it lets our adversaries have the advantage of selecting when and where to fight and creates the possibility that we will exhaust and disillusion ourselves by responding to an unending series of skirmishes in hopes of avoiding the big war. The Kennedy-Johnson administration followed such a strategy of addressing indirect threats as its version of containment. It resulted in what historian John Lewis Gaddis has called, "something approaching national bankruptcy."²

We can avoid this outcome now because we are no longer engaged in a global struggle. Consequently, we have greater latitude to choose where to engage. Good criteria for engagement can help us make decisions that will allow us to escape the engagement dilemma: if we restrict our engagements too severely, we run the risk that our security will be eroded in the long-term by the accumulating effects of problems that individually do not warrant a response; if we engage to solve all the problems we encounter, we risk squandering our moral and economic resources in places of marginal or no interest, frustrating and exhausting ourselves so that we refuse to engage when we should or are incapable of doing so effectively. We must respond to incremental threats, but only to those that matter. Criteria for engagement help us make these decisions.

As the Soviet empire collapsed, the Bush administration increasingly needed such criteria. But the problem has been more acute for the Clinton administration, which has had some difficulty dealing with it. To his credit, a few months before he resigned, former Secretary of Defense Aspin remarked that "we need some criteria (for the use of U.S. forces) because, clearly, the number of places that need help exceeds the number of troops we will have . . . It's a different world and it needs to be thought through." Aspin was echoing the remarks of the 19th century British Minister just cited, albeit, by speaking of places that need help, with a typically altruistic American spin. Aspin noted that the administration would be spending a lot of time developing such criteria, a process that obviously had not been finished by the time he resigned. Then, in his defense, someone described as his ally told a reporter that, "we have a dilemma, which Somalia exemplified. We haven't worked out when, where, and how we are going to commit our forces in this new age."

Under political pressure as well as the pressure of reality, the Clinton administration has restricted the global rhetoric of its first election campaign. For example, the administration moderated its support of multilateral peace operations, publishing rather restrictive criteria for

deciding whether and how the United States will engage in such operations. Aspin's successor, William Perry, went further and outlined some general criteria for the use of force and military forces in the post-Cold War world. In a speech in November 1994, he distinguished three categories: vital interests, those that justify going to war or the decisive and overwhelming use of force; important interests, those that justify only a selective use of force; and humanitarian interests, those that justify the use of our troops and military assets, but not of force. These distinctions have now become part of our national strategy. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has accepted the tripartite categories articulated by his predecessor, adding a note of caution about engaging too frequently in humanitarian operations. We should engage in these only "from time to time," according to Cohen.³

The distinctions made by Secretaries Perry and Cohen are helpful but not sufficient. We need to specify, for example, what are vital and what are important interests. Once we have done that, we might want to know why we should not use decisive force to handle important interests. Assuming that the problem is susceptible to such force, would it not be better to use it and finish with the problem? As for humanitarian operations, if we accept that we should engage in them only from time to time, how do we know when that time has come? These and other issues implicit in our current engagement criteria need further discussion.

Such discussion is most controversial when the subject is humanitarian operations. We generally agree that we do have vital and important interests and that it is legitimate to use force in pursuit of them. While it is always possible to ask whether any particular use of force is justified, in the case of humanitarian operations, the question is whether we are ever justified in undertaking any such operation. This question arises because humanitarian operations are operations that help others. We may help ourselves, of course, when we help others by, among other things, gaining influence. In some cases, we might even use humanitarian aid primarily to benefit ourselves in some way. But

generally speaking, in the vast majority of cases, humanitarian operations primarily benefit others. The benefit to us, if there is one, is likely to be only indirect, speculative, and incalculable. Therefore, people wonder whether we should ever engage in humanitarian operations, especially if doing so puts American lives at risk, even inadvertently.

If we conclude that we should not engage in humanitarian operations, as do those who are called realists, no other criteria for engagement in these operations are necessary, except for some suggestions on how to persuade the American people that we should avoid them. If we conclude that we should engage in them, as those we might call moralists do, then we must determine how important such operations should be to us, how we should rank them among all activities and engagements overseas, and what commitment of resources they justify. Making such determinations will allow us to judge when the time has come to engage in humanitarian operations. What we discover in considering the justification of these operations is that neither the realists nor the moralists are right in making unqualified claims against or for such operations. The truth lies in a middle position that cannot be defined with mathematical precision. Even so, this middle position provides the most solid basis we have for deliberating about humanitarian operations. We must understand it in order to rank properly these operations among those we undertake and to devote to them the resources, the material, and the lives they deserve.

Are Humanitarian Operations Ever Justified?

Perhaps because what we owe to ourselves is more evident than what we owe to others, among those who have a firm view of humanitarian operations, realists tend to predominate. They oppose humanitarian operations because they believe we cannot afford to undertake them. Realists argue that nations exist in an anarchic world characterized by the struggle for power.⁴ Since power is relative and its basis constantly changing, the pursuit of

power must be unending. It becomes the primary concern for a state, a concern that is so pressing that it leaves room for no others. It takes precedence over acting according to principle and rules out using power to help others.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, when she was Ambassador to the United Nations, took a contrary view, arguing that a moral imperative required the United States to help others. "I believe that when the United States can make a difference, that we have a moral imperative to make a difference."⁵ If we accept this moral imperative, we will clearly be set on a course of frequent intervention abroad, since as Secretary Aspin noted, there are many places where people need help and the United States can make a difference.

Does this imperative exist, however? If there were a moral imperative to help others, by definition, we would be bound morally to obey it. Since the needs of others are without limit, we would in effect be under an order to exhaust our resources in helping them. An individual might conclude that saving his honor or his soul required that he ruin himself to help others when he was not thereby helping himself. We recognize and admire this kind of heroic virtue. But does the United States have an obligation to be so heroically virtuous? Does the U.S. government have the right to demand that American citizens be so virtuous? The government, as our representative, can demand that we risk our lives in war, but it can do so legitimately because we consent to be citizens, and as such we accept the rights and duties of citizenship. That consent is based on our recognition that U.S. citizenship is to our benefit. It does not follow from this that the government can demand that we exhaust ourselves for the sake of foreigners when doing so will not benefit us. If our government had this authority, it would cease to be our agent, becoming our master in a way incompatible with our liberty and the limited government that we accept as legitimate. If there is a moral imperative in our foreign action, then, it is not to help others at whatever cost to ourselves, but to do no more harm than necessary in protecting our way of life. It may be true that,

with the demise of the Soviet Union, we are freer than we were to undertake humanitarian efforts. But this does not mean that we must. Confronted by the endless need in the world, we must decide what we are able to do that is compatible with our own well-being. In the mid-19th century, the British were free enough from foreign threats that they could devote significant energy to suppressing the international slave trade. In the late 19th century, on the other hand, Great Britain's geopolitical position did not permit it to help the Armenians being slaughtered by Turks even though the British government was so inclined.⁶ In both cases, the British acted appropriately. Morality does not require imperatively a foreign policy of helping others no matter what the cost to us.

A moralist might try to defend engaging in humanitarian operations, as the Clinton administration does, by emphasizing a way these operations supposedly benefit us: for instance, they preserve or enhance our power. Natural and man-made disasters can generate mass migration or in other ways increase instability around the world. Such instability helps create a worldwide climate of insecurity that encourages nations to arm or to act more belligerently than they would otherwise. Because this insecurity domino effect eventually touches our interests, acting to curb it helps preserve our power. A variant of this argument would contend that if we do not concern ourselves with instability wherever it occurs, we will forfeit our role of world leadership, which would not be to our advantage. Promoting stability around the world, including engagement in humanitarian operations, according to the *National Security Strategy*, is therefore not a crusade but a pragmatic commitment.⁷

Unfortunately, for moralists the first version of the argument that we must concern ourselves with instability around the world has at least three difficulties. First, it is not clear that there is an instability domino effect. It is doubtful, for example, that the arms race in Asia is a result of conflict in Africa or how we deal with it. Proponents of this domino theory will note that thugs on the docks in Haiti,

shouting about what happened to U.S. forces in Somalia, chased away a ship bringing U.S. military personnel to Port au Prince. To them this proves that, if American prestige suffers in one part of the world, its power is diminished in another. While there is some validity to this line of reasoning, it does not imply that the United States should be concerned about any conflict anywhere. Such a claim was more plausible during the Cold War, when we faced one predominant enemy in a virtual global struggle, whose opposition was based on ideology as well as interest, and who could exploit a failure occurring in one place by taking action in another. The world is no longer like that. Our enemies are not all alike, nor do they all think alike or act for the same reasons. In resisting one, we are not resisting all. The United States now faces a variety of enemies with different prejudices, capabilities, and predilections in a variety of regional settings. On the face of it, there is no reason to believe that they will all respond in the same way to a setback suffered by the United States far from their borders. If disengaging from a problem in a marginal area diminishes our prestige, we can more than recover by a strong performance in a more important area. Deterring North Korea did not require a victory over Mohammed Aided in Somalia. It required effective action against North Korea. Similarly, standing tall in Somalia was not the best way to handle Haiti. Each regional conflict must be dealt with on its own merits.

The second difficulty with the "insecurity domino effect" is that the effort to suppress conflict around the globe would require intervention on an unprecedented scale. This in itself would create a climate of belligerency and insecurity. Many of these interventions would require the use of military force, since they would be undertaken against the wishes of local or regional players hoping to profit from the victory of one or another of the belligerents. The practical consequence of the argument for intervening to ensure world stability, in other words, is a situation the exact opposite of the one it hopes to create: a proliferation of instability and human suffering. Finally, an effort to enforce global security would require a vast commitment of

resources altogether disproportionate to the good likely to be achieved.

The commitment of resources to counter conflict worldwide might be proportionate to some achievable good if, to enter into the second variant of the argument for a global concern with stability, such a commitment enhanced our role of world leadership, and if such a role actually brought us some advantage. No doubt, given the power of tautology, assuming the job of world policeman would give us a leading role in the world; but it is difficult to see how this would give us any advantage absent something like an insecurity domino effect, which we have argued does not exist. In some cases, our political or military power may translate into economic gain or our economic power may give us a political advantage. In these cases, this transference should be taken into account and weighed against the danger of overextension and exhaustion when deciding whether or not to intervene. But it does not follow that successful intervention anywhere will always be to our advantage, economic or otherwise. The United States has played a leading role in the world and will continue to do so because it is economically and militarily strong. These strengths generate political power. Our founding ideals provide moral influence. We do not have to suppress instability on a global scale to have this power and influence. Therefore, we need not be concerned with instability wherever it occurs.

The effort to meet the realist's objection to humanitarian operations on his own terms, that they serve our interests, is not persuasive. This is unfortunate because the realist's argument has a disturbing implication. In its most extreme form, the subordination of all other concerns to the pursuit and acquisition of power would amount to saying that "the statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective . . . The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power."⁸ Since the pursuit of

power is unending, making it our primary concern leads us to seek to extend our power indefinitely; to imperialism. Since, according to this argument we should subordinate our principles, like consent of the governed, to the pursuit of power, the resulting imperialism might be indistinguishable from tyranny.

What saves us from this unsavory consequence is the fact that the realist's argument is open to two serious objections. First, the realist contends that we should focus on what is in our interest. But the term "interest" has different meanings. It can mean not only immediate advantage but also ultimate good. According to this latter understanding of interest, seeking power or having it is not always in one's interest. The power to do as he pleases is not in the interest of a fool, for example, who, because he is a fool, will only hurt himself if he has the power. For a people, also, what is in their interest is not necessarily identical with "access to oil, security of lines of communication, or control of key industrial assets or natural resources,"⁹ for although these things may increase the power, this increase in power may corrupt them. Some Americans worried that this was in fact happening in the late 19th century, as America's power grew and it acquired overseas territory, or after World War II, when the confrontation with the Soviet Union unavoidably reset our priorities. Keeping in mind the fact that doing what increases one's power is not necessarily identical with doing what is in one's interest, we could say, contrary to the realist, that helping others was in a people's interest, as long as helping others was good for that people, even if helping others did not increase that people's power or even if it decreased it.

Here, however, the realists would counter that a people and their government cannot afford to consider the needs of others because they are always so needy themselves. Governments must concern themselves only with the relentless pursuit of power because they are always in a desperate life and death situation. This is not true (the second objection to the realist's argument) if it implies that it is not possible to distinguish the degree of danger in which

nations live. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, the United States is in less danger than it was. As these things go, the difference is significant. In 1950, NSC-68, a thorough assessment of the national strategy required by our confrontation with the Soviet Union, countenanced "any measures, overt or covert, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design."

In 1950, such extreme measures were justified by the magnitude of the threat. The threats that face the United States today are not of that order. As a general rule, therefore, we are no longer justified in using "any measures" that might serve our interests. Dangers still exist and while some may justify extreme measures, our relative superiority gives us greater latitude in engaging with the world than we have had previously. For example, although due regard for our interests and those of others requires restraint, we are now freer than we were during the Cold War to promote free markets and to encourage respect for human rights.

Reflecting on the actions of the British in the 19th century and on our own recently changed situation indicates that we can distinguish between the circumstances in which nations live and what these circumstances permit. There may be times when the dangers a nation faces are so great that all it can do is struggle to preserve itself using any measures available. Its concern for its power at this time will be paramount. At such times of dire necessity, what distinguishes the statesman from a tyrant may not be the methods each uses but only that the former uses them reluctantly and by necessity while the latter uses them gladly and willingly. It is the difference between the power exercised as a necessity by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and that exercised by Adolf Hitler from the time he took power in 1933. At other times, a nation may face no immediate threat to its existence and be free to act accordingly. It may even be free to engage in humanitarian intervention.

Although the United States is now freer to undertake such interventions than it was during the Cold War, is it in

its interest to do so? In an important sense, it is. At the time that the question of whether or not we should intervene in Somalia was being debated, many argued that America would be diminished if it did nothing. There is an important element of truth in this sentiment. We have noted above that an undiluted concern with power ultimately leads to tyranny over foreigners. But if over foreigners, why not over our fellow Americans? America, after all, is a nation of foreigners. We have all come from somewhere else, most of us rather recently. As a nation of foreigners, how we treat foreigners bears on how we treat each other. This is true of the United States as it is for no other nation because of our founding principles and history. We have some slight common bonds of history but none of blood or religion. What constitutes us as a people is not race, color, or creed but what founded us as a nation, a commitment to the principle that all men are created equal and all that implies, commonly expressed in the slogan that America is the land of opportunity for all. This is a commitment to an ideal that encompasses all humanity. Any human being is potentially an American citizen—indeed, a potential Secretary of State. Thus, unlike any other nation, we have a concern with humanity. One way this expresses itself is in the urge to undertake humanitarian operations, like the one in Somalia. The absence or constant denial of this urge would diminish us, given our peculiar character as a people. Undertaking humanitarian operations is in our interest, then. These operations are not just charity but result from a legitimate public interest and are legitimate subjects of government action.

This conclusion will please the moralists, but it has limited import. Our concern as American citizens with humanity is not an imperative. Any human being is potentially a fellow American citizen, but there is a significant practical and therefore moral difference between the potential and the actual. Our concern must first of all be with our actual fellow citizens. Many things the government does bear on how we treat our fellow citizens, including taxing, administering justice, regulating commerce, and promoting social policies. Taken together, it

is reasonable to say that these functions of governing our society have a greater effect on how we treat each other than whether or not we undertake humanitarian operations abroad.

In general, then, one could argue that the United States should undertake humanitarian operations only when not doing so would adversely affect our attitude toward our fellow citizens or compromise our peculiar national character. Making this judgment requires an acute sense of the American people, as well as careful weighing of the possible benefits of such an operation against its costs. A humanitarian operation might remind Americans of their commitments to one another and thus to all mankind, but it might also be one too many engagements overseas and encourage isolationist backlash or anti-foreigner sentiment. At what point will engaging in these operations distract us from addressing threats to national security from emerging regional hegemony or would-be peer competitors? Making judgments about whether to engage in humanitarian operations will never be easy. What should be clear, however, is that we have only a limited interest in such operations. This indicates that we should follow some rather stringent criteria when trying to decide whether to engage in them.

Criteria for Engaging in Humanitarian Operations.¹⁰

We can group engagement criteria for humanitarian operations under two headings: those for humanitarian crises that are occasioned or accompanied by fighting—nonpermissive humanitarian operations—and those for crises that are not—permissive humanitarian operations.

Since nonpermissive humanitarian operations put Americans at risk, they should only be undertaken when the pending tragedy is of historic proportions. Using 20th century benchmarks for slaughter as a guide to what constitutes an “historic” proportion would mean that events

in Somalia and Rwanda would probably not qualify. But there is more to take into account here than just the number of victims involved. Circumstances and context are both important. For example, coming as it did at a transitional period, when the role of the United States in the world was unclear and new standards for international action might have been set, intervention in Somalia might have qualified even if the scale of suffering was not sufficient to warrant intervention. The cause of the crisis must also be taken into consideration. Given our principles, racially or religiously motivated slaughter might compel our intervention more than politically-motivated fighting. In this view, Rwanda would have had a greater claim on us than Somalia. At the time, this was not apparent because of our engagement in Somalia, which underlies the need for stringent engagement criteria for nonpermissive humanitarian operations. Undertaking these operations too frequently undermines our commitment to humanitarian operations and might jeopardize our willingness to respond to other kinds of challenges overseas.

In keeping with our limited interest in humanitarian operations, we can suggest a few additional guidelines for involvement in nonpermissive humanitarian operations. We should not undertake them unless the intervention part is of a multilateral effort to which others contribute troops, supplies, or money; our intervention is necessary to persuade others to participate in the humanitarian effort; we can limit our commitment to the resources necessary to galvanize a multilateral effort; or we can limit our commitment to the absolute minimum expenditure of resources necessary to accomplish the immediate humanitarian objective of preventing a catastrophe of historic proportions.

The same general considerations outlined for nonpermissive humanitarian operations apply to the permissive kind, although they can be applied less stringently since our involvement does not put the lives of Americans at risk. Yet, precisely because the danger is less, there is less need to involve American troops. As much as

possible, therefore, we should leave permissive humanitarian operations, including both short and long-term disaster relief, to domestic and international nongovernmental relief agencies. This will help preserve U.S. Government resources for those challenges it is best suited to address, for example, providing logistical support. In some cases, the U.S. Government may want to contribute to international efforts to relieve suffering when aid agencies are not capable of responding rapidly enough. If so, local circumstances and available U.S. resources should dictate the form and means for delivering such assistance.

Once In, What Then?

What we have discussed so far deals with the decision about whether or not to engage in humanitarian operations. Once the decision to engage has been made, we must then do so efficiently and effectively. There are some guidelines that will help us do this. We can group them under four headings: preventing "mission creep," countering the CNN effect, securing the positive results of our intervention in the long term, and disengaging.

Preventing Mission Creep. "Mission creep" is the unconscious or deliberate assumption of policy goals or operational objectives that commit resources beyond what our interests call for. If we are engaged in a situation where our vital interests are at stake, mission creep is not a problem. The notion of vital interests implies that we would cease to exist if these were not defended successfully. When we engage for the sake of interests that are not vital, on the other hand, there is an implicit commitment to engage only those resources commensurate with our interests. In these situations it is important to avoid making more than this commitment. Of course, if we engage at one level but discover that we have greater interests at stake than we thought, then we might want to increase the scope of our mission. This is not mission creep but a sensible adjustment of our mission's scope.

Somalia illustrates how easily mission creep can happen. When the marines went ashore in UNITAF, the goal was famine relief. Force was used against the factions equally and only insofar as necessary to get the relief aid through. But controlling food was a part of the political struggle in Somalia. Since Aideed had the upper hand, UNITAF's even-handed approach disadvantaged him. Because UNITAF was not pursuing a political solution, however, Aideed could live with this, waiting until we departed to pursue his agenda. From the beginning, there were some who objected to UNITAF's limited approach, arguing that unless it helped reconstruct the country we would be returning in the future, doing the same work all over again. This sentiment combined with the Clinton administration's desire to support the U.N. to produce an emphasis on working out a political solution in Somalia. This compelled Aideed to resist what became UNOSOM. His resistance led to the U.N. branding him a terrorist and to an escalation in the U.N.'s use of force. The result was the fight on October 3, 1993, that both led to calls for greater use of force and to the U.S. decision to withdraw.

Somalia represents a case where the combination of an operational imperative to provide security and a policy preference to support the United Nations reversed the order of our objectives. We began with the objective of providing humanitarian aid and the security necessary to deliver it. But providing aid eventually became only part of a larger process of fostering a political solution. While not every case of mission creep is as dramatic as this, it happens often enough to warrant concern. A way to guard against it is to be sure that our policy goals stay as limited as our interests and that operational objectives coincide with policy goals at every stage of involvement.

There are several ways to encourage the correspondence of policy goals and operational objectives. First, ensure that goals and objectives are disseminated throughout the civilian and military bureaucracies and that adherence to them is enforced so that lower-level assertiveness or contrariness does not encourage mission creep. Second,

public and private diplomacy should make absolutely clear to all what our goals and objectives are, thus helping to reduce the demand for expanding those goals as the mission unfolds. Third, when part of a coalition, we need to be sure that our role and the command and control relationships are clear. This will help to limit the kinds of unplanned activities that can expand our objectives. Finally, when operating with a coalition, we must ensure that all contacts with indigenous political leaders are handled by the U.N. or the multilateral force, thus keeping the operation from becoming "an American show." This last guideline applies only in those situations where we are sure that our goals and those of the U.N. or the multilateral force coincide. If there is disagreement about goals, then allowing others to take the political lead could result in the United States becoming committed to goals that are beyond its interest.

Ensuring that this does not happen will require care when working through the United Nations, since there is always a possibility of tension between our interests and those of the U.N.. Ideally, the U.N. should remain impartial to the interests of any one state or groups of states. To attain this goal, the U.N. must regard crises anywhere with the same seriousness.¹¹ To have taken more seriously the slaughter in Bosnia than the slaughter in Rwanda, for example, would have been to take a Eurocentric view, one unacceptable to the U.N.'s non-European members. From the perspective of the United States, this means that our engagements under the U.N. banner risk becoming much deeper than if we consider only our own interests.

Handling the CNN Effect. An important aspect of managing our engagements is seeing to it that public pressure does not prevent them being selective. We are referring here to the so-called CNN effect. There is a shocking fatalism among government officials about our ability to resist television pictures of starving or otherwise distressed human beings. Giving in to this fatalism is tantamount to giving up any foreign policy, for we will have lost control of what we do. To avoid this, an administration must articulate guidelines for engagement and use them

during its policy deliberations. The National Security Council Staff should have a prime role in this effort, ensuring that such guidelines inform the interagency deliberations over which it presides. An administration must also use these guidelines repeatedly in its public affairs efforts, including testimony to Congress. Even at the level of generality necessary to avoid embarrassing allies or others, or trapping ourselves, publicly articulating guidelines for engagement may help diffuse the CNN effect. If done before a crisis erupts, such efforts will serve as a preemptive attack on media influence. Articulating guidelines will not put an end to this problem, but it can help keep discussion of when and how to engage as deliberate as possible.

Just as we must take steps to prevent media-generated public pressure from drawing us into engagements that we should avoid, so must we consider situations where media-driven public pressure might cause us to withdraw too soon. Many people believe that public pressure will now invariably compel the United States to withdraw once its forces take casualties. Since the battle on October 3, 1993, in Mogadishu, it is common to hear people say that we are now down to a withdrawal threshold of 18 killed in action. This belief, however, is based on misconceptions and misunderstandings. Fear of casualties influences the decision to intervene, but once casualties are taken during the intervention, the public response has usually been a desire to escalate so that we could win and then withdraw. This response, however, depends on a public perception that the intervention has a purpose.¹²

Securing Positive Results. This will help the United States avoid engaging in the same rescue missions over and over again. In addition to following the guidelines outlined above, we can do several things in planning an engagement that will improve the chances of producing positive effects in the long term. We should try to make sure that the policy goals articulated to all agencies include a description of our long-term goals and that these are taken into account during operational planning. Military planning must also

be done in coordination with other agencies. Plans which called for the destruction of the Panamanian Defense Force during the effort to capture Manuel Noriega were not sufficient to ensure that the intervention in Panama would have positive results. Since the State Department and other agencies were not privy to military planning, the subsequent hand-off between DoD and the State Department and other agencies was uncoordinated and disjointed. To secure positive results, all operational planning needs to be done within the interagency process so that coordination and cooperation take place from the beginning. In doing this, operational security need not be breached. The critical point is that nonmilitary agencies have to be aware of the likely consequences of military action, and that plans have to be established to coordinate military with civilian efforts. If that is done, the transition from combat to operations other than war will be made more smoothly than was the case in Panama. Similarly, private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations should be involved early in planning, as UNITAF did in Somalia, and as was done again in Haiti.

Disengaging. These various guidelines and suggestions will help us determine better whether and when to engage and how to do so more effectively. If followed, they will also help us disengage by limiting our commitment to what our interests require. Making disengagement easier is important because it is a crucial part of any operation where our vital interests are not at stake. By definition, such operations should not be fights to the death; we should always plan to disengage. In these operations, the United States frequently will confront adversaries who have greater interests at stake in a given situation than we do. Thus, they will be willing to commit more resources, human and otherwise, than we. When they increase the pressure by escalating their commitments, the only rational decision may be for us to disengage. Knowing how to disengage, and under what circumstances, is as important as making plans for engagement.¹³

The importance of disengagement is generally recognized, so much so that when any engagement is considered, so is an exit strategy. While having an exit strategy may provide a degree of political cover, there are a myriad of ways it can go wrong once we are engaged. Being a part of a coalition complicates matters and reduces our ability to exercise direct control over events. The United States cannot dictate to the United Nations, other multilateral organizations, or our allies. Decisions taken in these complex settings may trap us. But we will not always be able to hang back until all our concerns are met or we will forfeit the role of catalyst. If, on the other hand, we engage unilaterally, that act alone generates interests that may undo an exit strategy concocted before the initiation of the engagement. Additionally, any commitment of military force raises the stakes in almost incalculable ways. For these reasons and others, effective exit strategies will be easy to construct but difficult to implement. Just as assessing our goals in an intervention must be an iterative process, so must the process of devising exit strategies, since policy goals and operational objectives, as well as circumstances, may all change as an operation proceeds.

Following these guidelines, or others more detailed and insightful, will not assure success in humanitarian engagements. Much depends on the skill of those in charge of the interventions and, to some extent, on factors over which we have little or no control. In addition, there are other factors bearing on our engagements overseas that the executive branch will always find hard or impossible to control. Congress, for instance, has been more assertive in foreign affairs since the end of the Cold War. A host of advocacy groups skilled in the use of communications technologies are willing and able to make themselves heard. Nevertheless, it is still possible to direct our foreign policy and to engage selectively in pursuit of its goals. Secretary of Defense William Perry demonstrated this by limiting our response to the slaughter in Rwanda. Such control will become increasingly necessary over the next few years as we struggle to distribute declining resources among

competing priorities and after that as we begin in earnest to prepare for the next enemy who threatens our way of life.

ENDNOTES

1. British minister quoted in Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981, p. 105, "Imperatively, I say, because our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars."
2. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment, a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 353.
3. Richard N. Haass, *Intervention, The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, Washington: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, pp. ix-x; "1 Percent Less," *Army Times*, September 27, 1993, p. 3; R.W. Apple, Jr., "Wounded in Policy Wars," *New York Times*, December 16, 1993, p. 1; *A National Security Strategy of Engagement Enlargement*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 18; *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Washington: Department of State, May 1994, for example, see p. 5; "Rules of Engagement," remarks by Secretary of State William J. Perry before the Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, November 3, 1994, *Defense Issues*, Vol. 9, No. 84, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, n.d.; "Operations: 'Strict Guidelines,'" Interview with Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *Air Force Times*, January 2, 1995, p. 40; Suzanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Issues Caution on Peacekeeping," *The Washington Post*, January 25, 1997.
4. See Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics, the United States and the Balance of Power*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970 ed. Spykman is the kind of realist we have in mind.
5. Catherine Troups, "Albight Cites 'Moral Imperative' for Bosnia Mission," *Washington Times*, December 13, 1995, p. 1.
6. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 106.

7. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington: February, 1995, pp. 22-24; *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington: February, 1995, pp. 2-4.

8. *Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics*, pp. 18, 22.

9. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, p. xv.

10. The discussion in the following paragraphs draws from Christopher J. Lamb and David Tucker, "Peacetime Engagements," in Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Conner, Jr., eds., *America's Armed Forces, A Handbook of Current and Future Military Capabilities*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996, pp. 295-337.

11. For examples of the U.N.'s even-handedness in dealing with conflicts around the world, see Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Chief Focuses on Africa's 'Underdog Conflicts'," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1995, p. A3; and John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, Washington: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, p. 37.

12. Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1994; Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "View of U.S. Deaths Depends on Mission," *The Baltimore Sun*, November 28, 1995, p. 1.

13. Fixing a date for disengagement is counterproductive. It can have the effect of emboldening the adversary, as it did when the United States fixed a specific date for withdrawal from Somalia after the October 3, 1993, fiasco in Mogadishu. See Haass, *Intervention*, p. 77.

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